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WELFARE STATE IN UNCERTAINTY: DISPARITY IN 
SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AND ATTITUDES1
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ABSTRACT In this paper we estimate empirically a prospective type of welfare 
regime for Ukraine through testing the correspondence between ideal types of welfare 
regimes and mass attitudes to state support of individual well-being. In accordance 
with G.Esping-Andersen’s classification (1990), we consider three types of welfare 
regimes which have their historical bases in Europe and use the examples of three 
European countries as empirical referents for comparative analysis. The analysis 
of social attitudes to welfare regimes is based on data from ESS Round 4 (2008-
2009) and is done in a three-dimension space of social expectations, assessments, 
and estimations of state social support for individual welfare. The comparison of 
social attitudes to state support for individual well-being in Ukraine and in three 
selected European countries allows us to come to a conclusion about the possibility 
of welfare reforms in Ukraine that would move it towards having one of the ideal 
types of European welfare regimes. Using a linear regression model we test the 
influence of institutional, cultural and structural factors on individual expectations 
about the social responsibility of a state. The empirical analysis demonstrates that 
the ‘three welfare regimes’ theoretical model accurately describes differences in 
social attitudes between West European countries like Great Britain, Germany and 
Sweden. However, as was expected from a theoretical perspective the empirical 
profiles of social attitudes towards welfare regimes in the post-Socialist countries 
contain substantial mismatches. The research outcomes highlight the currently very 
unsteady process of welfare development in different types of European societies. 
Post-Socialist states as a whole, and post-Soviet states especially, are unique ‘worlds’ 
of welfare attitudes in wider Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At the threshold of the 21st century European societies were challenged 
by societal transformations, the collapse of former state socialism and 
crises of capitalism. These processes sparked the emergence of new forms 
of inequalities, mass protests, institutional changes and the growth of mass 
discontent with the state and social regulation policy. Neoliberalism spread 
across the world with its attendant ideas of the market regulation of social 
wellbeing and the interconnected concepts of ‘welfare state’, ‘social state’ 
and ‘good society’ were ejected out of mainstream intellectual, scientific and 
public debate. The ‘ejection’ of the issues and the corresponding concepts 
happened in parallel with the deep crises in welfare state practices (Svallfors 
2003; Esping-Andersen 2006; Pierson 2001), viz.:
–  the ‘warping’ of the market as a result of a cost-based welfare state. This 
‘strangled’ the market through its requirement for a level of taxation 
high enough to ensure the maintenance of social programs, as well as 
a decrease in labor motivation and various stimuli designed to increase 
capital accumulation and investment;
–  the long-term effects on the welfare state sparked by the aging of the 
population; these effects are connected to increases in the financial load 
that working people and social infrastructure as a whole must bear;
–  the undermining of traditional models of social solidarity; changes in 
family values;
–  challenges to the new global economy in terms of ineffective governance 
and noncompetitive economies;
–  technological displacement of the middle class under the current economic 
crisis.     
However, no later than at the end of the first decade of the 2000s under the 
new global economic crisis the pendulum of public and academic attention 
started to shift back in the opposite direction; viz. to strengthening the role of 
the state in regulating numerous social issues. In 2009, at the suggestion of 
the president of Kirgizstan, the United Nations General Assembly created an 
annual World Day for Social Justice. In the special resolution of the UN the 
following items were specified as necessary: eliminating poverty, guaranteeing 
full employment, ensuring the provision of worthwhile and meaningful jobs, 
welfare and social justice for all people, and equal rights for men and women. 
One of the most influential sociologists of the time – Randal Collins (2010: 
30) – in his plenary paper at the conference in 2009 (devoted to a centenary of 
the Sociological Review journal) justified the idea that the Keynesian model 
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of the welfare state should be bought back into current social policy, which 
would, in Collin’s mind, provide an escape from the deadlock of the current 
crisis of capitalist states.  
The financial and economic crisis has since 2008 caused a destructive effect 
on the middle classes (through inflation and the closure of credit programs, a 
slump in the financing of education and science etc.) as well as on the different 
vulnerable groups (through inflation, the growth of unemployment and the 
elimination or scaling down of social programs). The crisis stimulated mass 
protests across the world. As a result, old and new elaborations of welfare 
state theories come again into the focus of public and academic interest and 
discussions. What kind of welfare state regime would be more successful in 
times of crisis and in a rapidly-changing world? What methods and indices 
of the state regulation of social risks and individual wellbeing would be more 
effective? Many scientists and politicians claim to have fixed the problems 
with the welfare state and to have contributed to renewing the discussion 
concerning both welfare policy prospects and the role of the state in supporting 
individual welfare. But debates on these issues have not yet ceased. 
Though the origin of the welfare state is dated to the late 1800s, the welfare 
regimes developed as “the heart of the institutional structure of all European 
societies” (Bable 2011: 571) came into being just after WWII. According to 
EuroStata data, if in 1960 the median level of social outlay under Western 
capitalism was 10 percent of GDP, by 2011 expenditure on social protection 
in the Euro Area-17 had risen to 30 percent of GDP, and in EU-28 was 29.1. 
However, this median level masks substantial variation among EU countries, 
ranging from 16-17 percent of GDP in Estonia and Bulgaria to more than 33-
34 percent in France and Denmark. 
A diversity of welfare regimes were formed on the bases of national 
varieties of social insurance and redistribution systems. The regimes were 
developed as “a collective piggy bank designed to insure against social risks” 
(Barr 2001) – such as individual risks to life, intergenerational risks, and class 
risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 40-43). They all have three main components: 
(1) a system of various forms of publicly-supported social insurance that are 
designed to deal with a range of individual personal risks (like infirmity in 
old age, or disadvantages caused by social origin/status); (2) a state-funded 
tax regime sufficient to purchase a fairly expansive set of public goods; (3) 
a regulatory regime for the economy that restricts the negative externalities 
caused by markets (unemployment, marginalization, decreases in earnings, 
etc.).
The development of Western welfare regimes after WWII was some kind 
of a response to state socialism with its social policy of mass protection 
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and, at least, the effect of a “positive class compromise” (E.O. Wright, 
2012) between the capitalist class and popular social forces. The socialist 
welfare regimes were formed as the principal feature of state socialism. 
They were unique in some ways and left a unique legacy for post-Socialist 
governments. During state-socialism, well-developed patronage systems of 
wide social security were created; however, these were strongly coupled 
to employment status, sometimes even more tightly than with the typical 
social insurance systems of Western European countries (Therborn 1995). 
The appropriate institutional systems were embedded into the socialist states, 
affecting everyday social life. State enterprises, as a rule, became centers 
of welfare provision, especially social and medical services. According to 
B. Deacon, the social policies under state Socialism were characterized by 
“heavily subsidized foods and rents, full employment, the relatively high 
wages of workers, and the provision of free or cheap health, education and 
cultural services” (Deacon 2002). The welfare institutions were formed in a 
strictly centralized economy with limited financial resources. Consequently, 
there was exclusive standardization, an extremely low quality of services, 
and coverage of only a small segment of the population in need (Boutenko, 
1997: 145). Despite this, for several decades of life under state socialism 
individuals used to enjoy a guarantee of full employment, social insurance 
(based on employment, or more narrowly, on occupation), subsided public 
goods and services, a developed system of social infrastructure and assistance 
from state enterprises. People got accustomed to relying on the state to insure 
them against multiple social risks. The patronage approach in welfare usually 
divides individual interests along the lines of clientele. Public-opinion polls 
bear this out, showing that the citizens of post-socialist countries (much 
like their West European neighbors) expect the state to play a greater role 
in the economy and the provision of social goods than do the inhabitants of 
developing countries (Boutenko, 1997). According to G.Therborn (1995: 89-
97), this kind of social welfare regime led to an occupationally-fragmented 
system of particular social rights, in contrast to the other variations of regimes 
that are based mostly on social assistance and usually tend towards having 
a general system of universal social rights, such as those that became more 
developed in different forms in Western Europe. 
Although the social-democratic path of welfare development after the 
collapse of state socialism was arguably the most suitable path for the post-
socialist states to follow, the social-democratic welfare model held no appeal 
to post-Socialist states. Instead, in the 1990s these states drew primarily from 
their conservative pasts and the liberal policies advocated by the Washington 
Consensus (Inglor, 2008; Fenger, 2007). 
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According to International Labor Organization data, public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in post-Soviet states by 2000 had been 
reduced in the Russian Federation (for example) to 8.7%, and in Ukraine to 
13.6%. During the first decade of the 2000s the situation with the social outlays 
in these countries did not change significantly: in 2011 the level of social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Russia was 12.0%, and in Ukraine 
was 13.6%. After the collapse of state socialism, under rapid institutional 
changes, market transition and the disruption of the state-guaranteed system 
of employment and corresponding social insurance (based on employment), 
the previous welfare socialist regimes collapsed. People faced high levels of 
uncertainty and insecurity, and experienced psychological trauma (as noted 
by P. Sztompka). Some of the post-Socialist states were inclined towards 
partially renovating the occupational insurance system using the European 
Continental welfare regimes as a template. This allowed some researchers 
to term these newly-existing welfare models ‘post-communist conservative 
corporatist’ models (Deacon 2002). At the same time, in 1996 and later in 
2002, G.Esping-Andersen rejected the idea of the emergence of a new type 
of welfare regime under post-socialism. He suggested that the differences 
between these countries and three specific European welfare regimes, the 
existence of which he defined, ‘were only of a transitional nature’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1996). These emerging regimes, as he concluded later, were 
influenced by models presented by the World Bank (Esping-Andersen, 2002). 
This conclusion was confirmed by M. Sengoku (2009) using an institution-
oriented approach. But Sengoku also noted that, in post-socialist countries, 
external drivers only functioned as catalysts. H.J.M. Fenger, in his study into 
the possibility of incorporating the post-socialist states into the typology of 
welfare regimes (Fenger, 2007), made an important conclusion about the large 
differences between post-Communist and Western welfare states, which the 
author claims are greater than the differences between the countries within any 
of those groups. This indicates the appearance of a specific post-communist 
type of welfare regime which is internally heterogeneous but which differs 
from all other European regimes across the parameters of level of trust, nature 
of social programs and the social situation in the post-communist countries. 
However, up to now the creation of an appropriate welfare regime has 
not been finalized in post-Socialist countries such as Ukraine, the Russian 
Federation, etc. Furthermore, it is not clear how the regimes will develop. This 
is why estimating the chance of a welfare regime of a certain type developing 
in a country, as well as placement of the post-socialist states in the welfare 
regime typology, remains an urgent research task. 
Two main approaches to the development of welfare state models can be 
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recognized. We associate these approaches with so-called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
programs. Within the weak program the justification of the selection of a 
welfare solution is grounded on some kind of normative orientation, or the 
best empirical pattern which functions successfully in a certain state. As a rule, 
such orientations reflect subjectively and ideologically-based ideas about the 
better social order. Implementation of this normative model as a real policy 
objective and its further development depends principally on legitimizing the 
model through mass acceptance; or, in other words, fitting the model to mass 
expectations and cultural orientations. Social processes are shaped by culture, 
social structure and the social actions of individuals and groups. Policies and 
regimes which are policy-supported but ‘unrooted’ in society may be rejected 
through mass dissatisfaction and protests. Thus the forced adaptation of any 
normative model of a policy on society can lead to unexpected outcomes such 
as social parasitism, alienation and a decline in the trust of social and political 
institutes. 
In contrast to the logic of the ‘weak program’ (and populist declarations 
about the need for normative-oriented welfare reforms), the ‘strong program’ 
of welfare policy-making is based on empirical evaluations of the capability 
of a society to adopt to a certain welfare model. 
Accordingly, with a ‘strong program’ orientation the choice of the better 
welfare regime not only concerns identifying the better institutional norms 
and rules for the state regulation of individual wellbeing. The embedding 
or adaptability of any institutional regime essentially depends on its mass 
support, or on the correspondence between institutional rules and mass 
expectations. As a result, in order to identify the more appropriate welfare 
regime for a society we need to evaluate popular expectations concerning 
the state regulation of individual wellbeing. In this paper we empirically 
ground a prospective type of welfare regime for Ukraine through testing 
the correspondence between mass attitudes to state support of individual 
wellbeing and ideal types of welfare regimes. In accordance with G.Esping-
Andersen’s classification (1990), we consider three types of welfare state, 
which have their historical foundations in Europe, and we use the examples 
of three European countries where these types were historically developed. 
By comparing mass attitudes to the state support of individual wellbeing 
in Ukraine and in three selected European countries, we attempt to derive 
a conclusion about the possibility of welfare reform occurring in Ukraine 
towards the ideal types of European welfare regime.  
Our research is based on a database derived from the 4th wave of the 
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European Social Survey2 which was undertaken in 2008-09 in European 
countries. This wave contains a special module in a questionnaire devoted to 
measuring attitudes towards the welfare state in Europe which was developed 
by St. Svallfors (2005), W. van Oorschot, Р. Taylor-Gooby, С. Staerkle, and 
J.Goul Andersen.   
RESEARCH GOALS
In this paper we make an empirically-based estimation of social expectations 
concerning the welfare state in Ukraine compared with Western (i.e. countries 
with well-developed markets and welfare traditions) and Eastern (i.e. post-
socialist) European societies. This intention is framed in the following 
research goals:
1.  specifying the basic empirical features of three welfare regimes in 
European societies and defining the empirical referents of welfare 
regimes in Europe. For comparative cross-national analysis and on 
the basis of the advanced Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime typology 
(Ebbinghaus 2012: 14), we selected three countries as referents. These 
represent more strongly the main welfare capitalism regimes; namely, 
Great Britain with its liberal (more market and individualistic) model; 
Sweden with a social-democratic (‘solidarian’) model; and Germany 
with a continental (‘Christian-Democratic’, more subsidiary) model 
of welfare. Poland and the Russian Federation as well as Ukraine will 
be included in the comparison as representatives of the post-Socialist 
Eastern European states with newly-emerging welfare models;
2.  owing to the fact that there is no knowledge about the normative levels 
of social attitudes to welfare regimes which could provide for their 
legitimation and successful implementation, we use a comparative 
method for further analysis. Application of a comparative method allows 
us to define the differences in social attitudes which reflect the differences 
between empirical welfare regimes and their successes. If we can identify 
through our empirical analysis a set of theoretically-estimated patterns of 
social attitudes to welfare regimes, this will be a weighty argument in 
favor of the selected variables and can serve to describe the basic features 
of the welfare patterns. International comparison of the variables will 
allow us to draw conclusions about the welfare perspectives of certain 
societies;
2 www.europeansocialsurvey.org
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3.  social attitudes to welfare regimes should differ not only under the lens 
of an international comparison (when the analytical unit is a nation-state-
society). Social attitudes (expectations) and estimations should depend 
principally on class structural cleavages, social risks, social trust and 
social policy. In testing the impact of the structural features of nations on 
social attitudes to welfare state, we analyze the strength of correlations of 
class and other social structure indicators to attitudes to welfare regime 
across nations. 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL WELLBEING IN 
A SOCIETY? 
The concept of the welfare state corresponds closely to a wider concept 
of social responsibility which has a sociological sense and recently has been 
adapted from the new economics of business (McBarnet & Campbell 2007) 
to contemporary theories of civil society and ‘social state’. Interpreting 
the welfare state through bringing a sense of social responsibility into the 
conceptual frame will allow us to depart from the strictly instrumental features 
of the concept (usually defined as a combination of social insurance, market 
regulation policy and a tax regime) and to outline the principal dimensions 
of a welfare state, its historical roots, and its embedding into a triangle of 
interrelations between family, state and society. It is natural that the activities 
of a state and public policy strongly affect society, the standard of living 
of communities and the family and health status of individuals, as well as 
their social involvement. However, in respect to the interrelations of a state 
with a family or individuals, and in terms of responsibility for a family’s 
welfare, a state can have different kinds of relationships: from a laissez-faire 
position of non-interference into families’ lives (‘an individual or a family is 
responsible for their own life/s’) to a position of active interference, control 
and regulation of individual\family welfare (‘the state is responsible for 
individual wellbeing’). In this set of variations in interpretation the social 
responsibility of a state appears as a kind of relationship between a state and 
families or individuals which corresponds to the obligation of a state to act 
to benefit society at large and individual wellbeing, as well as in how a state 
assists and deals with different social issues, has concern for living standards 
and acts in relation to the social inclusion of individuals and preservation of 
the social solidarity that exists in society. 
Some recent studies into the social development and responsibility of a 
state have contributed in different ways to the theoretical interpretation of 
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welfare. The basic contemporary notions which have enriched the conception 
are summed up in:
–  the ‘good society’ approach in the neo-Kantian tradition, established in 
the 1960s-70s by Rawls and Habermas and later developed in the ‘binary 
discourse’ into universalism or communitarianism vs. particularism as 
modes of the good society development and the achievement of social 
wellbeing. The sociological communitarian version of the good society, 
developed by A.Etzioni (1996), and the ‘moral civil society’ vision by 
J.Alexander (2000; 2006) have their focus on the moral quality of a 
community (Etzioni) or on citizenship (J. Alexander), and on morality 
and solidarity in explaining the main sources of individual wellbeing and 
civil society efficacy. On the basis of research into the long-term survival 
and more or less effective enclave economies that were developed by 
ethnic migrants, A.Portes (1987) involves the concepts of ‘bonded 
solidarities’ and ‘civil engagement’ in interpreting the successfulness 
of the corresponding community. The value of a web of crisscrossing 
affective social bonds, and the moral quality of values and mores in 
interpreting community and citizenship as foundations for individual 
wellbeing are the basic components in the triangle of relationships 
between the individual, state, and society; 
–  an institutional and political-economy approach, recently by the ‘New 
Constitutionalists’ such as W.Anderson, St.L.Elkin, Ph.Green, etc. (Soltan 
& Elkin 1996; Elkin & Soltan 1999, etc.), and by G.Esping-Andersen 
(2002), which underlines the significance of ‘citizen competences’ 
(as it is interpreted by the ‘Constitutionalists’) and the role of ‘good’, 
norm-oriented institutional design in developing an efficient democratic 
citizenship, as well as a welfare state;
–  the ‘community-driven development’ and ‘social accountability’ approach, 
widely promoted via World Bank reports since 2004, underlines the idea 
of the significance of citizen involvement (the critical point for enhancing 
democratic governance) in improving service delivery; the ability of 
citizens, civil society organizations and other non-state actors to hold the 
state accountable (Ellison 1997; Carnwall and Gaventa 2000; 2001) and 
make it responsive to their needs. The “Demands for Good Governance’ 
(The World Bank Report 2013) principles are designed to strengthen 
the capacity of NGOs, local communities and the private sector so they 
can hold the state (authorities) accountable for creating higher levels of 
wellbeing. The interpretation of the welfare state on this theoretical basis 
is focused on demand-driven mechanisms which are operated from the 
bottom-up and create the social accountability of the state (authority and 
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decision-making). Social accountability can play an important role in the 
development of collaboration between the state (government) and civil 
society and help public institutions to meet the expectations of society;
–  the ‘assets and сapability approach’ developed by A. Sen (1999; 2009) 
emphasizes a notion of universal human rights in evaluating various states 
with regard to justice; it recognizes that formal and informal institutions 
can facilitate or constrain efforts to secure people against poverty and 
social exclusion. Based on a person-centered institutional interpretation, 
Sen not only emphasizes the importance of assets but draws attention 
to their returns – or how those assets translate into improved wellbeing 
for poor people. To ensure those returns, institutions must allow assets 
to be used productively and freely, promoting, in a term used by Sen, 
‘capabilities’.  
The current development of the re-interpretation of social responsibility 
and the set of potential welfare regimes are oriented around the theoretical 
ideas mentioned above.   
The historically-based responses to the challenge of who takes responsibility 
for an individual’s or family’s wellbeing rest on the three pillars, between 
which responsibility is shared: state (governance), communities (civil 
society), and the individual (family), with his (its) market competitiveness. 
Subject to the accent that is placed on one of the ‘pillars’, empirical models 
of responsibility for welfare and corresponding welfare regimes have been 
developed between the following extremes. First, the laissez-faire approach, 
resulting in rudimentary models of the welfare state with undeveloped 
legal rights for citizens in terms of social security and public assistance; the 
individual good depends on the market forces and becomes a primary concern 
of individuals, their family and different communities. Second, the totalitarian 
models of public control designed to engender a certain standard of wellbeing 
that is firmed and secured by the state without the influence of the market, as 
in the model of state socialism in the former USSR. 
G.Esping-Andersen (1990; 1996), Svallfors (2003) developed the concept 
of welfare regimes making the stress on the ‘systemness’ of institutional 
arrangements and analytically defined three basic models manifesting 
themselves within the market economy, wiz.: (i) the ‘liberal’ welfare model; 
(ii) the Scandinavian welfare model; and, (iii) the continental European welfare 
model. All of these models are embedded into capitalism (with liberalism 
or social democracy), but not all of them have an equalizing effect because 
social insurance has often focused on income security rather than equality. 
Now all these models face challenges from the crisis of capitalism as well as 
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the impact of emergencies of the welfare state per se (Kaufmann 2010). All 
these models are developing towards adaptation the new challenges of social 
contracts between a state and the different generations as well as the vulnerable 
social groups. The updating models are more oriented on social inclusion and 
cohesion policy via employment and the generational contract. The former 
socialist welfare states, under the impact of liberal democratization and free 
market capitalism, and after the dismantling of their previously-strong social 
patronage institutions, have partly kept or revived their old traditions of social 
insurance, as well as partly recreating new forms of social protection. After 
the breakdown of state socialism-driven systems, the post-Soviet countries did 
not follow the Scandinavian road to universalism but rather the Continental 
method of introducing occupational social insurance. At the end of 2010, 
welfare policy in post-soviet countries is even more employment-related than 
in Western Europe (Inglor 2008; Bable 2010: 576). As a result, according to 
Th.Bable, J.Kohl, and Cl.Wendt, the new ‘layered’ complex welfare systems 
in Eastern European countries do not easily fit into the typologies developed 
on the basis of ‘varieties across Western Europe’ (2010: 580). However, there 
have been few quantitative analyses of advanced welfare regimes (including 
the post-Soviet countries), partly due to their situations as transforming 
states (Abrahamson 2010) as well as to the absence of good national-level 
statistical data. Despite the scale of challenges to welfare state, the majority 
of comparative, institutional and sociologically oriented studies have flagged 
up various degrees of change such as the recalibration, recasting, renewing or 
reforming of welfare states, but have concluded that these changes have led 
to the survival of the welfare state (Clegg, 2007; Drahoukoupil, 2007; Castels 
and Obinger, 2008). The outcomes of two-decades of research into welfare 
systems by different researchers allows us to assert that the ‘regime-typology’ 
approach in comparative analysis remains useful for conceptualizing the 
differences between welfare states, as well as classifying the empirical 
similarities between them, taking into account national historical legacies. 
However, the conceptualization of empirical variations of welfare regimes 
needs further development with the inclusion of the post-Soviet welfare cases 
and cultural parameters such as social attitudes and expectations. 
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MACRO-LEVEL PARAMETERS OF THE SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
The selected countries differ significantly in terms of quality of life (see 
Table 13) and social expenditure of the state (see Table 2). Components of life 
quality define the risk to individual wellbeing and thus can be used to support 
identification of the preconditions of social attitudes to the welfare state, to 
social protection and to the need for social assistance.  
Table 1 Selected indicators of quality of life in six countries
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Ukraine 68.5 110 0.796 2800 31.0 8.8
Russian Federation 66.2 116 0.817 9370 40.5 7.5
Poland 75.5 46 0.880 1260 34.5 9.6
Sweden 80.8 8 0.963 48930 25.0 8.4
Germany 79.8 17 0.947 42560 28.3 7.1
Great Britain 79.3 24 0.947 41520 36.0 7.8
*  UNDP. Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and 
Development. N.Y.: UNDP, 2009.- 229 p.
**  The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/
distribution_of_family_income_gini_index_2007_0.html
Table 2 Total Social Expenditure as a proportion of GDP (%), 1980-2010
1980 1085 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ukraine -* - - - - - 25
Russian Federation - - - - - - 16
Poland - - 14.9 22.6 20.5 21.0 21.8
Sweden 27.1 29.4 30.2 32.1 28.5 29.4 28.3
Germany 22.7 23.2 22.3 26.5 26.2 26.7 27.1
Great Britain 16.7 19.8 17.0 20.2 19.2 21.3 23.7
Sources:  OECD (2012)
* national and international statistics do not include an interpretation of the meaning of the 
indicators
3  The table consists of data relevant to 2007-2010 as institutional background for the ESS-4 
research into social attitudes for which data was collected in 2007-2008.
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According to the indicators of quality of life, Ukraine ranks lowest in the set 
of countries under comparison, with the exception of life expectancy, the Gini 
index and social expenditure, which are lower in Russia. Russian society in 
2007 was more polarized and had less welfare than Ukraine. There is significant 
difference between life expectancy, HDI and GNI per capita between the post-
Socialist countries and the Western European countries selected for analysis. 
Some positive trends in the social-economic development of post-Socialist 
societies in the first decade of the 2000s (decreases in absolute poverty, as well 
as increases in life expectancy) have not remarkably impacted overall quality 
of life in a cross-national perspective. Moreover, in the 2000s the tendency 
towards the aging of the population sped up and was attended by an increase 
in the emigration of more educated youth from post-Socialist countries. These 
structural features increase the social risk to individual wellbeing which is felt 
by citizens; they impact social demands and public expectations of the state.
In relation to state responsibility, we distinguished three referent models – a 
‘liberal’, a ‘social-democratic’, and a ‘continental’ model. We investigated the 
fitness of these models for describing society and examined how legitimate 
they are.  
Each of the models differs from the other in terms of state social 
responsibility: from less responsibility in the ‘liberal’ model to a penetrating 
level of responsibility in the ‘social-democracy’ model. However, state 
penetration into a society and private individual’ or families’ life can bring 
both positive and negative social effects. The likely positive effects are 
decreases in social tension in society, poverty and social inequality. At the 
same time, negative effects can arise due to the huge social commitments 
of a state which impact the economy, slowing down economic growth and 
weakening social ties and solidarity in a society, as well as decreasing an 
individual’s responsibility for their own (and their family’s) wellbeing.
We analyze social attitudes to the welfare state in a three-dimensional space 
of: (1) individual and class-based expectations about the state’s capacity for 
social protection, or the social responsibility of a state; (2) a social assessment 
of the utility of the welfare state; and, (3) social estimations of the risks to 
social development of a welfare regime. 
It is assumed that the inclination of citizens for a ‘social-democracy’ model 
will be characterized by expectations for strong state social assistance and a 
presumption of the high utility of the welfare state in combination with the 
expectation that there is only a small risk that the welfare state will negatively 
impact the development of society. In contrast to this case, it is supposed 
that the inclination of citizens towards a ‘liberal’ model will appear in mass 
desire for a weak form of state social assistance (due to the prevailing idea 
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that social responsibility means citizens taking responsibility for their own 
wellbeing and that of their families), as well as of the weak utility of the 
welfare state, alongside presumptions that a welfare state presents a high 
risk in terms of its negative impact on social development. Meanwhile, it 
is assumed that the supporters of a ‘continental’ model will have moderate 
expectations concerning the welfare state and its utility and assume it will 
have modest negative social consequences. It is moreover supposed that such 
an assessment of the utility and risk of a welfare state can explain strongly 
expectations about the social responsibility of a state. The generalized 
expected profiles of commitment to these three basic welfare state models are 
presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Generalized expected profiles of commitment to different welfare state 
models 
Citizens’ attitudes
Models of welfare state
Liberal Continental
Social-
democratic
Assessment of social responsibility of state -+ + ++
Assessment of utility of welfare state -+ + ++
Risk assessment of welfare state ++ + +-
The symbols “+” and “-” designate theoretically-expected (relative) expressions of strong 
attitudes (“+”), and weak attitudes (“-”).
These theoretically-expected profiles were tested on empirical data about 
mass attitudes in six European countries. This procedure allowed us also 
to define empirically the location for each country under scrutiny along 
the dimensions of three basic models. We assume that the countries with 
well-developed market capitalism and a long-term history of a welfare 
state regime will display the criteria described in the corresponding model 
of mass disposition as measured by social attitudes and expectations. The 
analysis of the profiles of post-socialist countries with institutionally changed 
welfare states, the reform of which are still in progress, allow us to outline the 
inclination of a society towards a specified welfare model. The conversion 
in our analysis from generalized indices (or aggregated data) measured at a 
country level to group-level analysis (at a social class, gender, age etc. level, 
or at the individual level) will allow us to define the factors that influence the 
inclination of citizens towards a certain welfare regime.
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SOCIAL ATTITUDES TO WELFARE REGIME: SOME 
FINDINGS FROM COMPARATIVE EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
The questionnaire used in the ESS-4 (2008-09) contains a module designed 
to measure public desire for state assistance in relation to the following 
social issues: health protection, employment security, support of a family 
and elderly people (questions D15-D204). The questions and indicators 
correspond with the main dimensions of a welfare state. In order to calculate 
an additive index on the basis of the indicators mentioned above, a one-
factor solution (using principal component analysis) was created for each 
country under scrutiny. The one-factor solution for each country ranges from 
explaining 47% of the variation for Great Britain to 57% for Ukraine and the 
Russian Federation. This is an important finding that supports the validity of 
the one-dimensional concept ‘social expectation of a social responsibility of 
a state’. The appropriate additive index, calculated as the mean of variables 
D15-D20, strongly correlates with the one-factor solution (r > 0.9 for every 
country). For the pooled data of six countries the one-factor solution explains 
55% of general variation and also strongly correlates with the appropriate 
additive index (r = 0.996). The reliability coefficient Cronbach’s a, which 
characterizes the internal consistency of the additive index, is rather high for 
each country and varies from 0.76 (for Great Britain) to 0.84 (for Ukraine), 
and is 0.83 for the pooled data. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, 
an index of citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of a state 
(named StatResp) was calculated as a mean of the variables D15-D20. The 
index varies from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means the public expectation that the state 
will not interfere in either individual or family wellbeing (the minimum social 
responsibility of a state), and ‘10’ means the opposite – the full (maximum) 
social responsibility of a state. The index’s means are compared for all six 
countries under study. The means of the index manifest essential and, what is 
important for us, theoretically-expected (for Western countries) differences 
4  See the following questions in the questionnaire: “People have different views on what the 
responsibilities of governments should or should not be. How much responsibility should 
governments have to…?” 
   D15 - …ensure a job for everyone who wants one?
   D16 - …ensure adequate health care for the sick?
   D17 - …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the old?
   D18 - …ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?
   D19 - …ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?
    D20 - …provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick 
family members?
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in values that allow us to consider this index to be a good measure of the key 
subjective characteristics (‘estimation of social responsibility of governance’) 
of the empirical welfare state models. Accordingly, this index can be used as 
a dependent variable for further analysis. The means for the six countries are 
presented in Table 4.
Table 4 Index of social responsibility of governance (StatResp, means for six 
countries)
Mean N Standard deviation
Ukraine 8.67 1845 1.57
Russian Federation 8.30 2512 1.66
Poland 7.76 1619 1.58
Sweden 7.74 1830 1.29
Great Britain 7.23 2352 1.35
Germany 7.20 2751 1.51
In line with theoretical expectations, Swedish society with its ‘social-
democratic’ model of welfare state manifests higher social expectations 
than British society with its ‘liberal’ model. The differences in means are 
significant at p < 0.05. The difference between index means for Germany 
(the ‘continental’ model) and for Great Britain is not significant (at p = 0.05); 
that is, is not consistent with theoretical expectations (see Table 3). Poland, 
according to this index of social expectations, inclines towards the ‘social-
democratic’ model (the difference in mean values for Poland and Sweden is 
not significant at p = 0.05). The highest social expectations can be observed 
in the Ukrainian and Russian data and can be explained by the strong claim 
for social assistance from states which were formed under state socialism. Let 
us note that the mean of the index in Ukraine is significantly higher than in 
Russia, but even in Russia’s case the mean of the index is higher than for the 
other countries under study. The question now follows: what factors influence 
social expectations (at the individual level)?
We constructed a further two indices, viz. an index of the utility of a welfare 
state and an index of the social risk presented by a welfare state on the basis 
of questions D21-D295 of the survey questionnaire. The two-factor solutions 
(principal component analysis) for each countries’ data have very similar 
structures and interpretations and explain a similar amount of variance. The 
second factor may clearly be interpreted as an assessment of the utility of a 
5 Wording of questions D21-D29 is presented in Table 5.
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welfare state and the first one should be understood as an estimation of the 
social risk that arises from the welfare state (on the development of society). In 
order to supply the further cross-national comparison, the final factor analysis 
was done on pooled (six country) data. The two-factor solution allows the 
same clear interpretation and explains 62% of general variation (see Table 5). 
Table 5 Estimation of social risks and the utility of a welfare state: two-factor 
solution for six countries (pooled data, principal component analysis, varimax 
rotation)
To what extent do you agree or disagree that social benefits and services in 
your country…
Factors
1 2
D29 …make people less willing to look after themselves and their family? 0.849 0.054
 D27… make people lazy? 0.843 0.052
 D28 …make people less willing to care for one another? 0.843 0.073
D21 …place too great a strain on the economy? 0.661 0.103
D25 …cost businesses too much in taxes and charges? 0.630 0.127
D23 …lead to a more equal society? 0.041 0.821
D22 …prevent widespread poverty? 0.106 0.797
D26 …make it easier for people to combine work and family life?  0.117 0.765
                                                                           Percentage of variance   38% 24%
The estimated factor values were linearly transformed, allowing us to 
create the following two indices: an index of the assessment of the utility 
of a welfare state (BenfSS) and an index of the estimation of the social risk 
that a welfare state presents (RiskSS). Both indices vary from ‘0’ (minimum 
assessment of utility as well as minimum estimation of social risks) to ‘10’ 
(maximum estimation). The means of three indices for the countries under 
study are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6 Empirical profiles of six countries in a three-dimensional space of attitudes 
to welfare state
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Ukraine 8.67 1 4.27 4 4.67 5
Russian Federation 8.30 2 4.15 5 4.43 6
Poland 7.76 3 5.51 2 4.93 4
Sweden 7.74 3 4.95 3 6.14 1
Germany 7.20 4 5.43 2 5.59 2
Great Britain 7.23 4 6.04 1 5.27 3
According to the data in Table 6, the ratio of mean values of the indices 
of the utility and social risks of welfare state for Great Britain, Germany and 
Sweden fully correspond to theoretical expectations (see Table 3). In Great 
Britain (the ‘liberal’ model), compared with the other countries under study, 
individuals estimate social risks to be highest (or, in other words, display 
the highest level of fear concerning the negative consequences on social 
development of a welfare state) as well as the lowest assessment of the utility 
of public social programs. The Swedish data (the ‘social-democratic’ model), 
in contrast, includes the highest assessment of the utility of a welfare state 
and the lowest estimation of social risks. The consistency of the empirical 
profiles of the welfare regimes of these three countries supports the validity 
of the specified three-dimensional space of social attitudes towards welfare 
regimes.  
Comparison of Western and Eastern European countries brings up some 
rather unexpected findings. The greatest (relative to other countries’) desire 
for the welfare state in post-Socialist Ukraine and Russia is combined with 
the lowest assessment of the utility of the welfare state, as well as with the 
lowest estimation of social risk. In summary, assessments and estimations 
both in Ukraine and Russia do not correspond to any of three basic welfare 
regimes. As a result, this evidence only partially confirms the typologies of 
welfare regimes elaborated by Fenger (2007) and Ebbinghaus (2012) with 
the institutional-oriented approach. So, if institutionally the welfare regime in 
Poland is a closer fit to the ‘continental’ regime of Germany (for example), 
the composition of relevant social attitudes and expectations is closer to a 
‘social–democratic’ model. As a consequence for policy development it 
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appears that attempts to implement any of the models which were historically 
developed and rooted in Western Europe will not find social support in post-
Soviet societies, and such social policies will probably be ineffective.
What determines social attitudes to welfare regimes?
Why do different societies demonstrate such diverse attitudes to the welfare 
state and desires about the social responsibility of a state to act to secure 
an individual and the family’s wellbeing? Or rather, what factors (at the 
individual level of analysis) influence such attitudes? 
The index of expectations about the social responsibility of governance 
(StateResp, as described earlier) is used as a dependent variable in the 
regression model. It introduced (see Table 5) two orthogonal (uncorrelated) 
indices – an index of the assessment of the utility of the welfare state (BenfSS) 
and an index of the estimation of the social risk of a welfare state (RiskSS), 
which both describe well the differences between empirical welfare state 
models (represented in the social consciousness of citizens), and which both 
can influence significantly social attitudes to the welfare state. 
We assume that social attitudes to a welfare regime and to the social 
responsibility of a state are a complex function of the institutional, cultural 
and structural parameters of the social interaction of individuals with a 
state and its institutions. As Shalev (2001) has put it, the argument is that 
welfare regimes should be seen as a limited number of qualitatively-different 
configurations with distinctive historical roots. Real long-term social policy 
and politics can affect strongly citizens’ social attitudes, expectations and 
assessments of a state; on the other hand, perceptions and expectations about 
the social responsibility of a state can differ according to social group and 
classes that have diverse access to resources that are unequally distributed 
across a society. On the basis of this reasoning in our explanatory model 
we include variables (illustrated in Table 7) that describe the factors which 
potentially determine citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility of 
the state for individual and family wellbeing.    
The complex effect of the interaction between individuals and welfare 
regimes is subjectively represented in individual experience. This ‘effect’ can 
be measured using four parameters: (1) a personal assessment of the utility of 
a welfare state (BenfSS index); (2) estimation of the social risks of a welfare 
state (RiskSS index); (3) personal evaluation of the national social system 
(SSEval additive index); and, (4) personal trust in public institutions (Trust 
additive index).
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The second potential group of factors contains an ideological and cultural 
dimension of social attitudes towards a welfare regime, presented at an 
individual level. In the analyses we use only one additive variable to measure 
attitudes to social justice supported by the state (Equality). 
The third group of factors presents the parameters relevant to social structure. 
We take into account in our analysis that there is substantial evidence that 
social cleavages drive the politics of welfare state reform. As C.de la Porte 
and K. Jacobsson (2012) note, different national patterns are embedded in 
social policy and help to shape distinct national varieties of capitalism with 
appropriate social structures. If in fact welfare states are deeply integrated 
into national variants of capitalism, one can expect that employers’ attitudes 
toward welfare state will be complex. This helps to explain why employers 
have often been more halfhearted and internally-divided over policy reform 
than many political economy theories anticipate (Shalev 2001). Highlighting 
the connections between social policy arrangements and socio-structural 
change, or the variety of cross-cutting lines of social conflict that emerge 
during the transition to a post-industrial or market economy (in the case of 
post-Socialist countries), allows for greater precision in identifying the social 
legitimizing of the welfare state that can generate the greatest discontent 
about welfare policy and its efficacy. We test two structural-sensitive models 
for explaining the social expectations of citizens – one based on taking into 
consideration social class cleavages (between employers and employees, for 
example – see the variable Employer in Table 7), and the other structural 
parameters such as gender, age, education, type of residence and personal 
social network (see Table 7). One of the questions that we are interested in 
answering is how influential social class cleavage is in explaining expectations 
for social responsibility in different welfare models.
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Table 7 Potential factors for explaining citizens’ expectations of social responsibility 
towards governance
Subjective effects of interaction of citizens with a welfare regime and social systems per se
(institutional factors)
BenfSS - index as described above
RiskSS - index as described above
SSEval
- evaluation of the social system of a country; single factor solution for D11-D14, six 
countries’ pooled data, principal component analysis, 52% of variance.
D11. What do you think overall about the standard of living of pensioners?
D12. What do you think overall about the standard of living of people who are unemployed
D13. What do you think overall about the provision of affordable child care services for 
working parents?
D14. What do you think overall about the opportunities for young people to find a job?
(0 means «extremely bad» and 10 means «extremely good»)
Trust
- trust in public institutions; index is constructed as mean of B4-B8 and varies from 0 (no 
trust) to 10 (high level of trust); Cronbach’s alpha is about 0.9
How much do you personally trust each of the following institutions…
(0 means “do not trust an institution at all” and 10 means “complete trust”)
B4 …country’s parliament?
B5 …the legal system?
B6 …the police?
B7 …politicians?
B8 …political parties?
2. Individual values of equality and social justice
Equality
- attitude to social justice supported by a state; single factor solution for B30 D1 D4, six 
countries’ pooled data, principal component analysis, 54% of variance 
B30. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels
D1. Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in 
talents and efforts. 
D4. For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small
(1 means «agree strongly» and 5 means «disagree strongly»)
3. Social structure belonging 
Employer 
- class cleavage under capitalism; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of 
employers (‘capitalists’, ‘small employers’ and ‘skilled managers’ according to the class 
scheme by E.O.Wright) defined in opposition to ‘employees’.
EmplType
- type of employability; dichotomous variable that identifies a select group of employees (=1) 
in contrast to those who have their own business or who are self-employed; calculated on 
F12, dichotomous variable 
Gender - dichotomous variable that selects men (=1)
ag_25
- dichotomous variable that selects people of 18- 25 years old (=1); selection of this age group 
was done on the basis of empirical calculations of the significance of different age groups in 
the linear model
Educ - education; the number of years that a respondent has spent in full-time education
City - dichotomous variable that select residents of cities and suburbs (=1)
LowInc
- dichotomous variable on F32 that selects families with low incomes (first three deciles of 
family income in the country = 1)
Reciprocity
- availability of social support from surrounding people (as an indicator of personal social 
network); 
F34. If you were in serious financial difficulties and had to borrow money to make ends meet, 
how difficult or easy would that be?
(1 means «very difficult» and 5 means «very easy»)
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The mean values of the key institutional and culturally-sensitive parameters 
for six countries selected for modeling are presented in Table 8. The data 
illustrates the significant differences between countries with Western 
European welfare state regimes and post-Socialist states, including Poland, 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In particular, in Ukraine and in Russia 
the high level of expectations of social support (StatResp) and the high level 
of support for income redistribution by the state to foster greater material 
equality between citizens (Equality) are combined both with a low estimate of 
the risk of the negative effects of social benefits and services that are provided 
by a state to the economy, and to morality in a society (RiskSS) and with a low 
estimate of the state utility of social support (BenfSS) as well as with a low 
appraisal of the effectiveness of the social system in general (SSEval). This 
mismatch in Ukraine corresponds to the extremely low level of trust in public 
institutions (Trust).
Table 8 Means of indices for six countries
Great 
Britain
Germany Sweden Poland
Russian 
Federation
Ukraine
StatResp 7.23 7.20 7.74 7.76 8.30 8.67
RiskSS 6.04 5.43 4.95 5.51 4.15 4.27
BenfSS 5.27 5.59 6.14 4.93 4.43 4.67
SSEval 5.75 5.82 6.13 4.68 3.88 3.55
Trust 4.58 4.86 5.57 3.31 3.57 1.75
Equality 4.52 4.73 5.02 4.98 5.57 5.32
The mismatch in the social attitudes in post-Soviet societies is evidence of 
the catastrophic shortage of the state in the social sphere during the market 
transition which resulted in a mass negative experience of the interaction 
between individuals and the state. The long-term negative social experience 
led to mass discontent with the state and the public’s alienation from it.
Below, two regression models are described which estimate the influence 
of different potential factors (see Table 7) on the level of expectation for 
the social responsibility of governance. The first model includes the variable 
Employer that was introduced into the model to facilitate investigation of any 
class cleavage between employers and employees (see Table 9).
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Table 9 Class-specific model of citizens’ expectations about the social responsibility 
of governance in six countries. Standardized OLS regression for each of the six 
countries. StatResp is a dependent variable
Great 
Britain
Germany Sweden Poland
Russian 
Feder
Ukraine
RiskSS -0.094* -0.120* -0.100* -0,111* -0.164* -0.140*
BenfSS 0.065* 0.042* 0.135* 0.102* 0.078* 0.037
SSEval -0.134* -0.131* -0.041 -0.144* -0.253* -0.231*
Equality 0.294* 0.307* 0.320* 0.324* 0.283* 0.115*
Trust 0,066* 0.011 0.034 -0.042 0.071* -0.094*
Employer -0.049* -0.017 -0.002 -0.074* 0.020 -0.101*
R2 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.13
* - coefficient is significant at the level p <  0.05
According to the class-specific model for all six countries, the strongest 
factor is the culturally and ideologically based variable ‘individual attitudes 
towards social justice’ (Equality), which corresponds with the redistribution 
policy of a state. It is interesting that this factor has more influence in West 
European societies with different welfare regimes (as well as in Poland) 
than in post-Soviet countries (especially Ukraine). This finding matches the 
general conclusion, recently stated by Swallfors and Kulin (2012), that “the 
links between values and attitudes are generally stronger in more materially 
secure and privileged classes [and societies]. However, the relative strength 
of the associations varies substantially across countries. Where inequality 
is smaller and poverty less prevalent, the link between values and attitudes 
becomes less class-specific”.
A negative assessment of the risk of a welfare state (or negative perceptions 
about the likely provision of social benefits and services to the economy 
and morality in a society) – RiskSS – is significant in all countries, but the 
most influence this factor has in the post-Soviet countries. At the same 
time, the effect of trust on public institutions (Trust) is much smaller and is 
significant only in three countries – Ukraine, Great Britain and the Russian 
Federation. It is interesting that in Ukraine, in contrast to Great Britain 
and the Russian Federation, the influence of Trust is negative. Concerning 
class cleavage (Employer), this has a weak effect on expectations about 
the social responsibility of governance only in Ukraine, Great Britain and 
Poland: employees have higher expectations about the social responsibility of 
governance than employers. But in Germany and Sweden, with their stronger 
social-democratic welfare regimes, the influence of a class cleavage is not 
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significant. In the Russian Federation the link between the class variable and 
expectations for socially responsible governance are not significant, but tend 
to be positive. This may be interpreted in terms of their undeveloped social 
contracts.
The other (‘structural’) explanatory model also includes institutional and 
cultural factors and is oriented at a wider set of social structure factors, excluding 
social class. The replacing of the factor ‘class cleavage’ with another set of 
social structural factors (age, gender, education, income stratification, type of 
residence and social network) does not significantly increase the explanatory 
power of the model (see Table 10). The basic structure of the influence of 
the institutional and cultural factors (which were also included into the first 
model) remains the same. The model demonstrates an essential nationality-
based character. In comparison with the other structural parameters, only the 
factor Education has a stable and significant influence on social expectations 
in most countries (except in Ukraine and Sweden): less educated people more 
strongly call for the social responsibility of governance. 
Other structural factors manifested as significant in 1-3 countries. For 
example, the factor youth (18-25 years old) is more significant in the 
explanatory model in Poland and has weak significance in Great Britain. 
In contrast, in Sweden, being older (belonging to an older age group) better 
(but also weakly) explains social expectations concerning the welfare state. 
Theoretically, it was expected that there would be more significance given to 
having a personal social network (Reciprocity) in explaining social attitudes 
to welfare states in post-socialist countries with unstable welfare regimes. 
But, as a negative factor (decreasing expectations about social support from 
the state), it was significant for only two western countries – Great Britain 
and Germany. It is interesting that only in the post-Soviet countries (Ukraine 
and Russia) was more social support from the state expected by people who 
dwelled in less urban territories (City). The factor economic stratification 
(income) manifested its significance only in post-socialist countries. In 
Russia and in Ukraine people with lower incomes expect more social support. 
The Gender factor is significant only in Sweden and Poland where females 
manifest more desire for social support from governance.  
Correspondingly, the models are found to be more influential for post-
socialist Poland and Russia than for all the other countries, and the influence 
of the structural model is a little better than the class-specific one for all the 
countries under scrutiny. 
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Table 10 Structural-specific model of citizens’ expectations about the social 
responsibility of governance in six countries (without a class variable). Standardized 
OLS regression for each of the six countries. StatResp is dependent variable.
Great 
Britain
Germany Sweden Poland
Russian 
Feder.
Ukraine
RiskSS -,108* -,142* -,103* -,107* -,167* -,164*
BenfSS ,079* ,052* ,140* ,099* ,062* ,000
SSEval -,114* -,094* -,028 -,172* -,213* -,197*
Equality ,269* ,271* ,287* ,274* ,256* ,140*
Trust ,056* ,015 ,030 -,037 ,111* -,121*
Reciprocity -,059* -,106* -,037 ,000 ,006 ,034
EmplType ,060* ,023 ,006 ,023 ,006 ,038
Gender -,018 -,038 -,108* -,080* ,039 -,052
ag_25 ,050* ,000 -,059* ,112* -,001 ,004
Educ -,078* -,076* -,035 -,176* -,067* ,072
City ,010 -,018 -,041 ,007 -,095* -,082*
LowInc ,041 ,035 -,003 -,065* ,069* ,108*
R2 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.22 0.16
* - coefficient is significant at the level p < 0.05
CONCLUSION AND POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
The empirical analyses of the three-dimensional space of social attitudes to 
welfare regime, as well as the causation model that explains the influence of 
a complex of factors on social attitudes, lead us to the following conclusions. 
First, social attitudes to welfare regime and the social responsibility of a 
state for individual and family wellbeing manifest themselves clearly in the 
three-dimensional space of social expectations, assessments, and estimations. 
The ‘three welfare regimes’ theoretical model clearly describes the differences 
in attitudes between West European countries like Great Britain, Germany 
and Sweden. The corresponding tools (indicators and questions) used in ESS 
Round 4 are sensitive enough for measuring the empirical differences in these 
models.
Second, social attitudes to the welfare regime diverge significantly when 
examined using a country comparative perspective. The attitudes (in the 
analyzed variables) correspond to social macro-parameters of the social 
quality of societies and the welfare regime state of development. Two types of 
welfare regimes are distinguished: (1) welfare regimes historically embedded 
into capitalism, the market and civil society; and, (2) emerging welfare regimes 
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under post-socialist transformation. The empirical analyses of social attitude 
profiles in Great Britain and Sweden indicate the correspondence with these 
profiles to the theoretical models of ‘liberal’ and ‘social democratic’ welfare 
regimes, respectively. However, the social attitude profile of Germany 
displays somewhat of a shift away from the expected ‘continental’ model 
toward a more liberal one. This indicates more liberal attitudes and a higher 
level of personal responsibility for individual and family wellbeing. One 
can assume that this empirical shift is the aftermath of the essential changes 
in social policy and welfare regime in Germany in the 2000s (Häusermann 
2010; Butterwegge 2012). 
As was expected theoretically, the empirical profiles of social attitudes 
towards the welfare state in post-Socialist countries contain substantial 
mismatches. From the post-Socialist countries examined, only Polish society 
manifests clear correlation between the indicators of social attitudes and 
assessment; these indicators also suggest an ‘inclination’ towards a ‘social-
democratic’ model of welfare regime. This conclusion does not agree with the 
placement of Poland in the ‘welfare regimes map’ developed by Ebbinghaus 
(2012) according to the institutional data for the regimes. One can assume that 
this inclination is a legacy of state socialism, and is also related to a decrease 
in the traumatic stress caused by the market transition in Poland in the 1990s 
due to appropriate social policy that allowed individuals to adapt better to 
new market institutions. 
Social consciousness in post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian societies remains 
more dependent on the paternalistic values and attitudes which dominated 
late Soviet society. These paternalistic attitudes manifested themselves 
on a background of an undeveloped sense of individual responsibility and 
social activity, as well as on the inability of societies to foresee the negative 
consequences of the welfare state on economic development as well as on 
the moral and social cohesion of society. The social consciousness of the 
Ukrainians is rather paradoxical: the very high expectations for the welfare 
state are combined with the lowest (in a comparative perspective) assessments 
of the utility of social policy, as well as with the lowest trust in the state, 
governance and other public institutes. The social attitudes manifested in 
post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia do not match those underlying any basic 
European welfare state models. Thus none of the models represented can 
be rooted in culture and social structure via social political reforms in the 
foreseeable future. 
Thirdly, using the linear regression analysis an empirical model of 
institutional, cultural, and structural determinants of social attitudes to a 
welfare regime was justified. One can assert that the social attitudes and 
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expectations of citizens depend essentially on individual interactions between 
the individual and policy institutes, as well as a social system as whole. 
The more positive the individual appraisal of the current system of social 
security and protection (in terms of education, health care and social support 
during unemployment) are, the lower the expectations for social support from 
governance. On the other hand, the greater the perceived risk of social policy, 
the lower the expectation for the social responsibility of governance. 
The assumption that level of family income is the most influential factor in 
determining attitudes to the social responsibility of governance is not justified. 
Individuals earning an amount which places them in the first three (lowest) 
deciles of income (LowInc) are more liable to have greater social expectations 
only in post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and Russia (in Ukraine this effect 
is more pronounced). 
Stratification according to education (Educ) appeared as more or less 
significant factor in influencing social expectations. Ukraine is an exception 
where there is no effect of education on social attitudes to the welfare state. 
One can suppose that individuals of all levels of education in this country 
experience similar social risks and feel a more or less equal need for social 
support from the state. 
The very high social expectations for a welfare state in combination with 
very low level of trust in public institutes, as well as a low assessment of 
the utility of a welfare state are paradoxical characteristics of the post-Soviet 
countries under study. It is especially in Ukraine that this paradox is most 
salient and indicates the catastrophic insufficiency of the social responsibility 
of governance. During the twenty years of post-Soviet development, this 
insufficiency of governance has not been compensated for by social policy or 
by the activity of any other agents of social responsibility (e.g. civil society 
or local communities). Under conditions of social, economic and moral 
crises in society and rapid changes in social structure and value systems, this 
weakness of the state leads increasingly to social alienation and produces a 
deep cleavage in interests between the governing actors and governing elites, 
on the one hand, and society as a whole, on the other.    
One of the unexpected results of our analysis is that class belonging (the 
employer vs. employee distinction that reflects industrial social cleavage) has 
a rather low or even insignificant influence on social attitudes to the welfare 
state. One can assume that this finding reflects the reality of modern capitalism 
in which capitalists, employers and managers adjust to the welfare state, and 
the welfare state adjusts to them. Over time, national welfare states become an 
important part of the institutional matrix that shapes practices at the level of 
the firm and influences broader efforts at national economic management. If 
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in fact welfare states are deeply integrated into national variants of capitalism 
it is obvious that employers’ attitudes toward the welfare state will be more 
complex. This conclusion helps to explain why employers have often been 
more half-hearted and internally divided over welfare state than many theories 
of political economy might anticipate.
The popular thesis about social cleavages determining social attitudes is 
not justified in our study. In Great Britain, with its liberal welfare regime 
and long-term class-oriented social policy, structural factors empirically 
manifest themselves only weakly. Even in Sweden, where large-scale public 
sectors might be expected to generate such structural effects, we are forced to 
acknowledge that empirical support for the thesis is no more than modest. In 
an effort to determine if these hypothesized cleavages over the welfare state 
actually exist in public opinion, Svallfors concludes that public vs. private-
sector employment does not seem to constitute a particularly important fault 
line (1997: 292; 2003). Our analysis also confirms that the differences in social 
attitudes are seldom statistically significant; they point in different directions 
according to different indices, sometimes showing, for instance, that public-
sector employees are more in favour of redistribution and smaller income 
gaps than private-sector employees, although it is sometimes the opposite.
In conclusion, let us note that our empirical analysis fixes its gaze on the 
very unsteady process of welfare development and on searching for fitter 
forms of social contracts in different types of European societies. Post-
Socialist states are special ‘worlds’ in the wide European space, in which the 
post-Soviet states are a quite distinct family (Castels & Obinger 2008: 321) 
of social systems and are constructing their own forms of social order. The 
development of better models of social responsibility that balance governance, 
market (family) and civil society using broad cross-class coalitions in support 
of major reform packages (Häusermann 2010) and successfully modify their 
models to meet the social expectations of a country is a challenge both for 
Western and Eastern European societies. However, it is sure that any such 
development will not be effective without the humanization of societies, the 
strengthening of trust in governance and public institutes, the strengthening 
of the social responsibility of public servants, and without the accumulation 
of positive interactions between citizens and the state.
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